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Tong Wang, Tong Yue and Xi Ting Huang*
Faculty of Psychology, Southwest University, Chongqing, China
Increasing evidence indicates that episodic future thinking (EFT) relies on both episodic
and semantic memory; however, event familiarity may importantly affect the extent to
which episodic and semantic memory contribute to EFT. To test this possibility, two
behavioral experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, we directly compared the
proportion of episodic and semantic memory used in an EFT task. The results indicated
that more episodic memory was used when imagining familiar future events compared
with novel future events. Conversely, significantly more semantic memory was used when
imagining novel events compared with familiar events. Experiment 2 aimed to verify the
results of Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we found that familiarity moderated the effect of
priming the episodic memory system on EFT; particularly, it increased the time required
to construct a standard familiar episodic future event, but did not significantly affect
novel episodic event reaction time. Collectively, these findings support the hypothesis
that event familiarity importantly moderates episodic and semantic memory’s contribution
to EFT.
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INTRODUCTION
People generate future-oriented thoughts frequently in daily life (Szpunar and Tulving, 2010);
these thoughts may be abstract or specific (D’Argembeau et al., 2011), and personal or non-
personal (Klein, 2013a,b). People may thus think about abstract and non-personal future events
(e.g., considering future environmental issues), specific but non-personal events (e.g., an upcoming
public event), abstract but personal events (e.g., the occupation one will take up after graduation),
and—characteristically—specific and personal future events (e.g., a date with an acquaintance
next Saturday). This latter form of imagining is called episodic future thinking (EFT); it involves
projecting oneself forwards in time to pre-experience an event that might happen in one’s personal
future (Atance and O’Neill, 2001; Suddendorf, 2010; Szpunar, 2010). EFT has received considerable
attention in the last decade, particularly regarding its cognitive processes (e.g., Hassabis and
Maguire, 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007; Irish and Piguet, 2013; D’Argembeau, 2015).
Two central hypotheses have been put forward to explain EFT’s cognitive process. The
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, introduced by Schacter and Addis (2007), proposes
that episodic memory (EM) provides memories of previous experiences that we can flexibly extract
and recombine into a novel episodic future event. This hypothesis emphasizes the close link
between EM and EFT. However, if one imagines EFT as similar to building a house, episodic
details extracted from memories may represent the bricks, but this is insufficient: the bricks
cannot be assembled into a house without an appropriate schema (Irish and Piguet, 2013).
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Irish and Piguet (2013) therefore proposed the semantic
scaffolding hypothesis, which proposes that semantic memory
(SM) importantly facilitates EFT by providing a scaffolding or
framework that allows memory retrieval and future thinking.
This latter hypothesis therefore implies that successful EFT
involves indispensable semantic information, as well as elements
of various episodic memories.
Mounting evidence from preliminary research supports
episodic memory’s critical role in EFT and the constructive
episodic simulation hypothesis. For example, clinical studies have
found that patients suffering episodic memory impairment also
experienced difficulty imagining personal future events (Addis
et al., 2009; Lind and Bowler, 2010; Matthew and Lori-Anne,
2011; de Vito et al., 2012a; Brown et al., 2013). Additionally,
extensive neuroimaging research suggests that a common brain
network including the medial temporal lobe, prefrontal cortex,
and posterior parietal cortex underlies both episodicmemory and
EFT (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007,
2008, 2012; Szpunar et al., 2007). Nonetheless, recent findings
indicate that SM also significantly contributes to EFT, supporting
the semantic scaffolding hypothesis. Studies examining patients
with semantic dementia directly support this hypothesis.
Semantic dementia is a progressive neurodegenerative condition
characterized by the profound and amodal loss of semantic
memory, but relatively intact episodic memory. Individuals
with semantic dementia experience difficulty imagining future
episodic events, implying significant EFT impairment (Irish
et al., 2012; Irish and Piguet, 2013). Additionally, functional
neuroimaging studies support SM’s important role in EFT:
some brain regions involved in semantic processing tasks (e.g.,
the inferior parietal, lateral temporal, medial prefrontal, and
posterior cingulate cortices, particularly in the left hemisphere)
are also recruited in imagining future events (Binder et al., 2009).
Further, behavioral studies examining healthy people suggest that
EM and SM jointly contribute to EFT. These studies found that
EFT relies on multiple representational systems, with personal
semantic knowledge providing a framework before specific
episodic details from remembered past events are accessed,
thus providing a context that organizes episodic details into
coherent themes and sequences (D’Argembeau and Mathy, 2011;
D’Argembeau and Demblon, 2012; Demblon and D’Argembeau,
2014). These findings collectively suggest that both EM and SM
play important roles in EFT.
It remains unclear if EM or SM is more important to
EFT; few studies have directly addressed this question. We
hypothesized that event familiarity importantly moderates EM
and SM’s relative contribution to EFT. We proposed this
hypothesis in response to several lines of research. First, in
some studies, imagining a familiar event was rated as more
clearly represented and containing more sensorial detail than
imagining a novel event (Szpunar and McDermott, 2008; Arnold
et al., 2011; de Vito et al., 2012b). We speculated that the
phenomenological difference between novel and familiar EFT
may stem from that imagining familiar events—relative to
novel events—depends more on EM, as this might permit the
inclusion of greater detail in representation of future events.
Second, Irish et al. (2012) found that patients with semantic
dementia showed a stronger tendency to represent events that
had been previously experienced in their entirety than patients
with Alzheimer’s disease when imagining their future, despite
explicit task instructions requiring them to generate novel
events not previously experienced. This may be because the
absence of SM particularly inhibits EFT regarding novel future
events. Third, a fMRI study found that regions associated
with general semantic processing (i.e., the left fusiform gyrus)
showed preferential activity as participants imagined novel events
relative to familiar events; this may also reflect the nature of
familiarity with particular events (Szpunar et al., 2009). In this
context, we hypothesized that familiarity would moderate EFT’s
relative dependence on EM and SM. Specifically, we hypothesized
that imagining a familiar event would involve more EM than
imagining a novel event, whereas imagining a novel EFT would
involve more SM than a familiar EFT. In order to test this
hypothesis, two behavioral experiments were conducted. In
experiment 1, we directly compared the proportion of EM and
SM used in novel and familiar EFT. Experiment 2 was designed
to test the results of Experiment 1 by examining if activating EM
systems would differentially affect familiar and novel EFT.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 45 undergraduate students (24 females; age
range: 19–25 years). A within-participants design was used:
participants completed both of two conditions (familiar vs.
novel EFT). No participants had previously participated in
any similar experiments; participants received a small payment
in compensation after completing the experiment. The study
protocol was approved by the Southwest University Research
Ethics Committee. All participants provided a written indication
of informed consent before participating.
Materials
A pilot study was conducted to identify suitable familiar and
novel settings. Sixty cue words (including nouns and verbs, half
familiar and half novel) were selected from the Modern Chinese
Dictionary (Lv and Ding, 2012) and the Chinese Affective
Words System (Wang et al., 2008). Additionally, all words were
constructed as familiar or novel future events (e.g., “graduation”
was constructed as “imagining your own graduation day”). These
events were presented to 32 college students who would not
participate the main experiment; these participants rated their
familiarity and emotional valence using a 7-point scale (1 =
not familiar at all, 7 = very familiar; 1 = very negative, 7
= very positive). Finally, two familiar events (“experiencing an
earthquake,” “your own graduation day”) and two novel events
(“experiencing a fire,” “climbing Mount Everest”) were selected
as event cues. The difference in emotional valence scores between
the selected familiar and novel events was insignificant [familiar:
M= 4.36, SD= 0.95; novel:M= 4.31, SD= 1.03; t(31)= 0.39, p=
0.70], but their familiarity scores differed significantly [familiar:
M = 4.10, SD = 0.91; novel: M = 2.51, SD = 1.09; t(31) = 7.82,
p < 0.001]. Familiarity scores collected after completing the EFT
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task supported this result [familiar: M = 4.95, SD = 1.24; novel:
M = 3.67, SD= 1.63; t(41) = 6.75, p< 0.001].
Procedure
The process included three sessions. Session 1 was the EFT task.
Following previous research (Szpunar and McDermott, 2008;
de Vito et al., 2012b), participants were presented with four
sheets of paper, each displaying the instruction to imagine a
specific episodic event occurring in their future corresponding
to the provided event cue. Participants spent 5 min imagining
each event in as much detail as possible and recording what
they imagined in writing. Participants then ceased writing and
proceeded to Session 2. Session 2 was a memory task adapted
from Anderson (2012). During this task, participants segmented
their imagined contents into separate single units (each complete
sentence represented a single unit). Participants were instructed
that if a given unit reminded them of anything in the past
when they were thinking about it, they should briefly record the
memory details they had consciously used when generating the
future details. In Session 3, participants rated the characteristics
of the imagined future event using a 7-point scale, following
previous research (e.g., Szpunar and McDermott, 2008; de Vito
et al., 2012b). Specifically, each event was rated on a sensory-
details index (three measures were summed: visual detail, sound
detail, smell/taste detail; 1 = none, 7 = a lot), a clarity-of-
context index (three measures were summed: clarity of location,
clarity of spatial arrangement of objects, clarity of spatial
arrangement of people; 1= vague, 7= clear), and an index of the
subjective experience associated with the mental image (intensity
of experience, 1 = none, 7 = high). Each of the four event cues
were presented to participants in a Latin Square order.
Data Preprocessing
Data from three participants were discarded because those
participants gave≥50% invalid responses (e.g., remembering past
events rather than imagining future events; failure to adhere
to the time limit). One invalid familiar and two invalid novel
events were excluded from among the remaining 42 participants’
responses. Thus, the proportion of valid data regarding familiar
and novel events was 92.2% and 91.1%, respectively. Memories
used in imagining future events were coded as EM or SM
following Renoult et al. (2012). EM memories characteristically
included episodic events, previous single episodes, or repeated
or extended events; SM memories characteristically included
organized knowledge, autobiographical facts, or abstract self-
related knowledge. All memories consciously used in EFT
were placed in a common pool and scored at random. The
primary scorer was blind to the study’s purposes, had undergone
extensive training, and had participated in the development of
the encoding principle. Following Levine et al. (2002), inter-
rater reliability was assessed by randomly selecting 25% of the
memories and scoring them using two additional trained scorers
who did not otherwise participate in this study. Inter-rater
consistency reliability was 0.70–0.85.
Results
First, differences in phenomenal character between familiar and
novel future events were analyzed using paired T-tests; this
analysis was intended to test the results of previous studies. The
results indicated that familiar EFT did not differ significantly
from novel EFT regarding the number of sensorial details and
the richness of the subjective experience, whereas familiar EFT
were rated as more clearly represented than novel EFT (Table 1).
We used Bayes factor analysis to test if the non-significant result
indicated insufficient power or supported the null hypothesis
(Dienes, 2011, 2014). Values of Bayes’ factor (B) <1/3 support
the null hypothesis; values >3 support an alternative hypothesis;
other values indicate that the data is unable to differentiate
between support of the null hypothesis and insufficient power.
Regarding the number of sensorial details, the mean and SE
of the difference were −0.12 and 0.101, respectively. Following
Dienes (2014), we calculated B using a uniform distribution, as
this permitted prediction of the maximum effect (uniform from 0
to 6) rather than specifying a plausible predicted effect size P. This
yielded B = 0.01. Similarly, the B-value of subjective experience
was 0.22. These results supported the null hypothesis; i.e., that
no difference existed between the familiar and novel events
regarding sensorial detail or richness of subjective experience.
We speculated that the phenomenological difference between
novel and familiar EFT stems from that imagining familiar
events—relative to novel events—depends more on EM, as this
might permit the more vivid and clear representation of future
events. Therefore, we tested if the proportion of EM and SM used
in EFT varied depending on familiarity. We found that more EM
was used when imagining familiar future events compared with
novel future events (Table 1). Conversely, more SM was used in
novel EFT relative to familiar EFT. This result supported our
TABLE 1 | Characteristics of familiar versus novel event representations.
Familiar event Novel event Main effect
M SD M SD F η2
Proportion of EM 0.75 0.16 0.56 0.17 79.69*** 0.66
Proportion of SM 0.25 0.16 0.44 0.16 80.62*** 0.66
Number of sensorial details 4.25 1.14 4.37 1.04 1.43 0.04
Clarity of context 5.25 0.97 4.38 1.01 25.28** 0.39
Subjective experience 5.00 1.11 4.73 1.39 2.34 0.06
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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hypothesis, indicating familiar EFT involves more EM than novel
EFT, whereas novel EFT involves more SM than familiar EFT.
Additionally, we found that participants used more EM than SM
in both familiar EFTs [t(41) = 10.37, p < 0.001] and novel EFTs
[t(41) = 2.41, p < 0.05], implying the overall importance of EM
to EFT.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to test if the results of Experiment
1 would remain stable following priming the EM system.
Prior priming of a system may facilitate performance in
tasks requiring retrieval of information from the same system
(Neely and Durgunogˇ, 1985); therefore, based on the results of
Experiment 1, we hypothesized that priming the EM system
would preferentially facilitate familiar EFT over novel EFT,
given that the former relies more heavily on EM. Further, we
hypothesized that the facilitation effect would emerge as reducing
the time taken to imagine familiar events or enriching the content
of familiar events. Finally, the results of Experiment 1 indicated
that both familiar EFT and novel EFT rely less on SM than on
EM; therefore, we did not include a SM priming condition in this
experiment.
Materials and Method
Participants and Design
This experiment used a 2 (priming condition: control vs. EM
priming)× 2 (event familiarity: familiar vs. novel) mixed design.
Priming condition was a between-participants factor; event
familiarity was a within-participants factor. Participants were
104 undergraduate students (52 female; age range: 19–25 years).
All participants provided a written indication of informed
consent prior to participating and received a small compensatory
payment. No participants had previously participated in any
similar experiments. Participants were randomly assigned
to conditions using Excel. The independent variables
were reaction time and the imagined events’ phenomenal
characteristics.
Materials
EFT task
Similarly to Experiment 1, 130 cue words (including nouns
and verbs, half familiar and half novel) were selected from
the Modern Chinese Dictionary (Lv and Ding, 2012) and
the Chinese Affective Words System (Wang et al., 2008) and
constructed as future events. In order to choose appropriate
EFT cues, 40 participants rated the selected words’ familiarity
and emotional valence. Five familiar and five novel EFT cue
words were subsequently selected. The familiar event cues
were “communicating with a foreigner,” “listening to a speech,”
“Playing football,” “attending a meeting,” and “taking a cable car.”
The novel event cues were “watching an opera,” “one day in the
desert,” “going skydiving,” “watching a bullfight,” and “attending
a religious service.” Familiar and novel cues differed significantly
regarding familiarity [familiar: M = 3.00, SD = 1.40, novel: M
= 1.55, SD = 0.91, t(39) = 6.33, p < 0.001]
1, but not regarding
emotional valence [familiar: M = 3.62, SD = 0.98, novel: M =
3.50, SD= 1.34, t(39) = 0.47, p= 0.64].
Materials for EM priming
The process for EM priming was modified from previous
studies and has been supported as priming only the EM system
(Philippot et al., 2003; Madore and Schacter, 2014; Jing et al.,
2016). Participants recalled a specific important episodic event
and then answered several questions inducing them to recall
specific details about the people, setting, and actions involved in
that event; participants were encouraged to elaborate further on
any details mentioned. A voice recorder was used to record the
constructed events and elaborations.
Procedure
The main experiment was comprised of the memory priming
and EFT tasks. First, participants assigned to the EM priming
condition completed the provided questionnaire, priming their
EM system. Participants began the EFT task immediately
afterward. Participants in the control condition performed only
the EFT task.
The EFT task procedure was presented on the screen of a
Lenovo desktop computer controlled by Eprime2.0 software. The
cue-word paradigm (Addis et al., 2007) was adapted for use
in this experiment; it proceeded through a construction phase,
an elaboration phase, and a rating phase. In the construction
phase, participants should construct a standard future event
corresponding to the provided cue-word once a red fixation
cross appeared (standard future events were specific events that
lasted for between several minutes and 24 h and simultaneously
contained the following elements: person, location, time, and
event). This phase was limited to 40 s, following the pilot study
(participants would grow impatient if this phase lasted longer and
hurry if it were shorter). Once a standard event was constructed
and spoken out, participants should press the “Enter” button
immediately, thereby entering the elaboration phase. Particularly,
the duration between the appearance of a red fixation cross
and the participant’s pressing of the “Enter” button was termed
the “reaction time” and measured as a dependent variable,
similar to Addis et al. (2007, 2011). In the elaboration phase,
participants continued to imagine and elaborate on the details
of the constructed event for a further 40 s in as much details
as possible. A bell would ring to indicate that the time limit
had expired; participants would then rate the EFT’s phenomenal
characteristics using the same questionnaire as in Experiment 1.
It is important to note that EFT task was explained to
participants prior to completing the memory-priming task and
participants completed some practice trials. The experimenter
would examine the results of participants’ practice trials
regarding the following aspects: if the constructed event was a
standard event, if the “Enter” button was pressed immediately
once an event had been constructed, and if the elaboration
1We did not collect familiarity scores after completing the EFT task (as in
Experiment 1) as EM priming spanning many intervening items would impair its
priming effect, and Experiment 1 have showed the results of pre-test and post-test
were consistent.
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phase was completed. Participants who met each point in their
practice trial began the main experiment; participants who did
not continued to practice until their practice trial met all three
points.
Data Preprocessing
After excluding invalid data (e.g., misremembered event cues,
such as mistaking “watching an opera” for “watching a movie”)
and invalid participants (e.g., participants who misremembered
≥50% of event cues), 88 valid subjects’ ratings of phenomenal
characteristics were retained (46 in the control condition, 25
female; 42 in the EM priming condition, 22 female). The valid
response rate was 84.6%. Regarding reaction time data, invalid
data (e.g., imagining a non-standard event, misremembering
the event cue, failing to press the “Enter” button immediately
once a standard event had been constructed) and invalid
participants (i.e., participants who gave ≥50% invalid responses)
were excluded, leaving 72 valid participants (36 subjects in
each condition, 19 and 18 female in the control condition
and EM priming condition, respectively). The valid response
rate was 69.2%. Interviews conducted after the experiment
suggested the task’s novelty and difficulty were responsible for
the relatively low valid response rate. Participants indicated the
instructions’ complexity made it quite difficult to adhere to them
in every single trial. Additionally, the standards for eliminating
invalid data were strict and contributed to reducing the valid
response rate. Gender and age were included as covariates in the
subsequent analysis.
Results
Reaction Time
The main effect of memory priming on reaction time was
significant: the control group constructed EFT events faster
than the EM priming group [F(1, 70) = 1.69, p < 0.05, η
2
=
0.06]. Event familiarity did not significantly affect reaction time
[F(1, 70) = 0.14, p > 0.05, η
2
= 0.002), and we calculated B
using a uniform distribution, as this permitted prediction of the
maximum effect (uniform from−40 to 40) rather than specifying
a plausible predicted effect size P (as there are no previous studies
or theory for reference). This yielded B = 0.01. Importantly,
the interaction between familiarity and memory priming was
significant [F(1, 70) = 11.81, p< 0.001, η
2
= 0.014].
Simple effect analysis indicated that familiar events were
constructed faster than novel events in the control group (p =
0.009). In contrast, familiar events took longer to construct than
novel events in the EM priming group (p = 0.03). Additionally,
compared with the control group, EM priming significantly
prolonged reaction time regarding familiar events (p= 0.003) but
did not significantly affect reaction time regarding novel episodic
events (p= 0.29; Figure 1).
Ratings of Phenomenal Characteristics
The repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that familiarity did
not have a significant main effect on the number of sensorial
details (Bayes’ B = 0.05; Table 2). However, the main effect of
familiarity on clarity of context and subjective experience was
significant, indicating participants rated familiar EFT as clearer
and involving a stronger feeling of having been experienced.
The main effect of priming on all phenomenal indexes was non-
significant (all values of Bayes’ B < 1/3), indicating that priming
the EM system did not significantly affect the content of future
events. The interaction effects between familiarity and priming
on all phenomenal indexes was non-significant; however, all
values of Bayes’ B were 1/3–3, indicating insensitive data.
The control group’s ratings of EFT’s phenomenal
characteristics fully replicated the results of Experiment 1,
which also found that familiar and novel EFTs did not differ
significantly regarding the number of sensorial details [F(1, 45)
= 0.38, p = 0.54, η2 = 0.01, B = 0.01] or subjective experience
[F(1, 45) = 3.10, p = 0.09, η
2
= 0.09, B = 0.29], and that familiar
FIGURE 1 | The interaction effect of familiarity and priming condition on reaction time.
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TABLE 2 | Phenomenal characteristics between familiarity and priming conditions.
EM priming Control Main effects Interaction
Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar Priming Familiarity
M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) F η2 F η2 F η2
Sen. 3.83 (0.56) 3.98 (0.77) 3.69 (0.83) 3.75 (0.80) 1.65 0.02 2.49 0.03 0.48 0.01
Cla. 4.89 (0.77) 4.49 (0.80) 4.93 (0.79) 4.55 (0.93) 0.10 0.00 32.24*** 0.27 0.02 0.00
Sub. 4.82 (0.84) 4.40 (0.83) 4.61 (0.85) 4.34 (1.05) 0.54 0.01 10.26** 0.13 0.49 0.01
Sen., number of sensorial details; Cla., clarity of context; Sub., subjective experience. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
EFT were more clearly represented [F(1, 45) = 14.87, p< 0.001,η
2
= 0.25; all statistics from Experiment 2].
In sum, in Experiment 2, EM priming mainly affected EFT
regarding reaction time and preferentially affected familiar EFT.
Specifically, EM priming increased reaction time for familiar but
not novel EFT. The former finding supported our hypothesis; the
latter interestingly did not.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we hypothesized that familiarity moderates EM and
SM’s contribution to EFT. We conducted two experiments to test
this hypothesis. The results of Experiment 1 directly supported
our hypothesis: both familiar and novel EFT relied more heavily
on EM than SM. Experiment 2 tested the results of Experiment
1 based on the consideration that priming the EM system would
interact with familiarity to affect EFT if the results of Experiment
1 were had been interpreted correctly. In Experiment 2, priming
the EM system affected familiar EFT more strongly than novel
EFT, further supporting our hypothesis. Collectively, these two
experiments’ results indicate that event familiarity moderates EM
and SM’s contribution to EFT.
Familiarity’s moderation of EM and SM’s contribution to EFT
may particularly depend on whether the individual is able to
draw on sufficient related episodic elements from his or her
episodic memory as raw materials to construct the imagined
future event. The dual-knowledge structure model proposes that
episodic memories provide the episodic elements (e.g., persons,
objects, locations) used to construct future events and scenarios,
whereas semantic memories provide a context or frame for
constructing and organizing the EFT and may also provide
complementary knowledge of one’s personal past (D’Argembeau,
2015). SM may be particularly important to novel EFT, as
few or no prior related episodic elements may be available
due to the absence of related episodic memories. In that case,
the individual may depend on SM to complement his or her
episodic knowledge by providing undifferentiated conceptual
information that “fills in the blanks,” thereby permitting the
construction of novel events (Irish and Piguet, 2013). This
proposal also explains why people suffering SM impairment
experience difficulty imagining novel events (Irish and Piguet,
2013). In contrast, regarding familiar EFT, sufficient related
episodic details are more likely to be readily accessible, allowing
the individual to use SM less. Accordingly, novel EFT showed
greater reliance on SM but less on EM, compared to familiar
EFT.
In Experiment 2, priming the EM system interacted with
familiarity to affect EFT, further supporting the hypothesis that
EM and SMdifferentially contribute to EFT. In the control group,
familiar future events were constructed faster than the novel
ones; however, priming the EM system significantly increased
reaction time for familiar EFT but not novel EFT. Hence, it
took much longer to construct a standard familiar future event
relative to a novel one. This result is completely contrary to our
hypothesis, in which we supposed that EM priming would reduce
the time needed to construct familiar EFT since sufficient related
episodic details were readily accessible. There are two possible
explanations for this result. One is that, according to previous
research, spreading activation was applied quite extensively to
episodic memory research (Roediger et al., 2001; Chan et al.,
2006); free recalling of a specific event may activate other
related episodic memories and make these related experiences
relatively accessible. It seems plausible that, when imagining
familiar episodic future events, EM priming makes a greater
number of episodic elements accessible, requiring individuals
to spend longer selecting and extracting the most appropriate
elements before recombining them into a coherent EFT. In
contrast, regarding novel EFT, EM priming activates only the
small number of existing related episodic elements, thus leading
to no significant effect on the time to construct novel EFT. In
contrast with the facilitative effect above, another possibility is
that the retrieval of a past event may lead to the phenomenon
of retrieval-induced forgetting, implying that free recall and
elaboration inhibit the retrieval of other episodic memories
(Bäuml and Samenieh, 2012), thereby preventing participants
constructing future events. Since familiar EFT relies more heavily
on EM, it would be affected more heavily than novel EFT. Future
research should test these possibilities.
In addition, participants in Experiments 1 and 2 (regarding
Experiment 2’s control group) both rated familiar EFT as
more clearly represented than novel EFT, although familiar and
novel EFT did not differ significantly regarding the number of
sensorial details or the subjective richness of experience. This
result is inconsistent with some results from studies conducted
outside the Chinese context which found participants have rated
familiar EFT as containing more sensorial details and giving
a stronger subjective experience, as well as being more clearly
represented (Szpunar and McDermott, 2008; de Vito et al.,
2012b). Therefore, they may partly reflect a culture difference.
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There are several possible explanations for this inconsistent
result. First, this difference may originate in differing narrative
practices pertaining to early parent-child conversation: Euro-
American mothers commonly engage in highly elaborative
memory conservations with their children, whereas Chinese
mothers tend to engage in less elaborative memory conversations
(Wang et al., 2011). We therefore suppose that the non-
significant difference in sensorial detail between familiar and
novel EFT may result from a Chinese tendency to attend less
strongly to episodic details in general, regarding both familiar
and novel events. Additionally, during interviews conducted in
this study, a large number of participants reported experiencing
difficultly imagining detailed future events; this may reflect a
general Chinese tendency to attend less strongly to episodic
details. Second, Chinese people may imagine familiar events
vividly, but omit a relatively large amount of detail when
asked to write it down or describe it aloud. The data used
for selecting event cues in Experiment 2 and the interview
after experiment partly support this possibility. Specifically,
the primary data of 130 event cues showed that familiarity
was significantly correlated with specificity (r = 0.838, p <
0.001), implying the familiar events were imagined more vividly;
additionally, during interviews some participants reported
being able to imagine future events more vividly than they
were able to report. Therefore, we suppose that the non-
significant difference in sensorial detail between familiar and
novel EFT may result from highly condensed expression in
general and particularly regarding familiar EFT. Third, the
visual perspective of imagination may underlie this inconsistent
result. A third-person perspective was more common among
participants from Eastern nations, while participants from
Western cultures resonated more strongly with a first-person
perspective (Christian et al., 2013). Moreover, visual perspective
may influence the vividness of mental imagery. Specifically,
a first-person perspective has been shown to provide greater
access to the sensory experiences of a mental event, whereas a
third-person perspective decreases sensorial experiences and is
more likely to emphasize propositional self-beliefs (Libby et al.,
2014; Christian et al., 2015, 2016). Therefore, the non-significant
difference in sensorial detail between familiar and novel EFT
may also reflect the fact that Chinese people more commonly
use the third-person perspective, regarding familiar and novel
events. Furthermore, the subjective richness of EFT is positively
correlated with the vividness of episode details (Tulving, 1985;
Szpunar and McDermott, 2008); accordingly, the richness of
subjective experience did not differ significantly between familiar
and novel EFT. Future research should test these possibilities.
This study’s results indicate that familiarity moderates EM and
SM’s relative contribution to EFT; this extends the understanding
of the relationship between memory and EFT. Nonetheless, this
study has the following limitations. First, Experiment 2 did not
include a SM priming condition, as the results of Experiment
1 indicated that both novel and familiar EFT depended less
on SM than on EM, which may reflect EFT’s “episodic”
nature, and implying that SM priming marginally affects EFT.
Future research should further explore this point. Second,
in Experiment 2, priming the EM system may have elicited
distinct emotions; these may have importantly confounded
analysis of EFT construction and elaboration. Therefore, future
research should separately analyzememory priming and emotion
priming’s effects on EFT. Third, participants were instructed to
say aloud or write down everything that came to mind while
they were imagining aimed to picture images in their mind;
however, the influence of narration conventions effect cannot
be excluded, people may spent time to structure their words
in consideration of clear narration (D’Argembeau and Mathy,
2011). Additionally, we adopted the cue-word paradigm and
aimed to separately examine memory priming’s effect on reaction
time and event’s content; however, as a natural process, EFT does
not necessarily proceed through construction before beginning
elaboration. Future research should therefore test this paradigm’s
ecological validity; for instance, by using event-related potentials
and fMRI to examine covariance in EM- and SM-related regions
during EFT and test if familiarity moderates the activation of this
functional network.
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